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MAXIMIZING THE VALUE OF PRIVACY THROUGH 
JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
ABSTRACT 
Bankruptcy aims to provide maximum redress to creditors. In corporate 
bankruptcies, legislation and regulation encourage the de-identification of 
consumer information and the restriction of sales to a limited pool of qualified 
purchasers operating in a similar industry. Judicial discretion is used to transfer 
privity from a debtor to a qualified purchaser. Both de-identification and the 
qualified purchaser requirement reduce consumer data values in bankruptcy 
and provide only a thin veil of protection. With decreased consumer data values, 
companies face reduced incentives to secure the data they hold, since tort law 
requires a recognized harm before it can provide a remedy.  
To avoid contravening the aim of bankruptcy and providing minimal 
protections to consumer privacy, judicial discretion should be used to alter not 
only the privity among parties but also the terms of purchase in bankruptcy. If 
purchasers are required to accept a minimum value of tortious liability for 
failing to secure data, then the amount they are willing to spend on data security 
will increase. As the security of data increases, its market value will likely 
follow. This treatment better serves the aims of bankruptcy by maximizing 
redress to creditors and better serves legislative intent by fostering consumer 
privacy. 
INTRODUCTION 
Each year, companies collect ever-increasing amounts of consumer data. As 
the amount of data possessed by companies increases, the risk of harm 
associated with a breach of consumer confidentiality grows in kind.1 Consumer 
data is collected to provide efficient and targeted services, but companies do not 
employ adequate security measures to protect the data they have collected.2 
 
 1  See Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opening Remarks at Fed. Trade Comm’n 
PrivacyCon 2017, 2 (Jan. 12, 2017); Nancy S. Kim, Contract’s Adaptation and the Online Bargain, 79 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 1323, 1341–43, 1349–50, 1355–56 (2011) (criticizing “hook” provisions in online user agreements that 
authorize the collection, retention, and commercialization of user data); FED TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING 
CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE 2 (Mar. 2012) [hereinafter PRIVACY REPORT]. 
 2  See Sasha Romanosky & Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy Costs and Personal Data Protection: Economic 
and Legal Perspectives, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1061, 1063 (2009) (“Personal information flows are necessary 
for the functioning of modern economies and are often beneficial to consumers (data subjects), first parties (data 
holders), and third party companies (data brokers). Consumers benefit from transactions involving their personal 
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Increased risk of harm is heavily correlated with how many records an entity 
possesses and the number of compromised records in data breaches increases 
each year.3 In 2005, 32,000 private information records were revealed in the 
George Mason University breach, which is minuscule compared to the massive 
Yahoo breach of 1.5 billion records in 2016.4 In 2017, the Equifax data breach 
demonstrated how a smaller number of records can potentiate severe harms.5 
Privacy is not generally a concern of bankruptcy law, but it often becomes 
one when consumer data is sold in corporate bankruptcies. Whether data is 
liquidated in chapter 7 or leased and sold in chapter 11 plans, corporate filings 
consolidate large stores of data, which exacerbates the threat to privacy. One of 
bankruptcy’s primary aims is to maximize redress to creditors, but when that 
redress involves consumer data, courts must weigh creditors’ financial interests 
against consumers’ privacy concerns.6  
Judicial discretion allows bankruptcy courts to balance those interests.7 In 
an effort to maximize efficiency and produce equitable results, courts often 
exercise discretion to authorize the sale of consumer data in bankruptcy. These 
sales may contradict express company promises that collected data will not be 
sold.8 Although courts claim that these distributions help repay creditors while 
 
data due to easier access to credit and insurance, customization, and personalization.”); James P. Nehf, 
Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L.REV. 1 (2003); Ramirez, supra note 1.  
 3  See Simson L. Garinkel, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS AND TECH., DE-IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONAL 
INFORMATION, NIST INTERNAL REPORT 8053 10-14 (October 2015), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2015/ 
NIST.IR.8053.pdf; Montjoye et al., Unique in the Shopping Mall: On the Reidentifiability of Credit Card 
Metadata, 347 SCI. MAG. 536, 536–38 (2015). 
 4  See Lazaro Gamio & Chris Alcantara, How Data Breaches Grew to Massive Proportions in 11 Years, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2016, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/business/the-scale-of-
large-hacks/; Ashley Rodriguez, How Much Were Yahoo’s Massive Breaches Worth? About $350 Million and 
More Future Headaches, QUARTZ (Feb. 21, 2017), https://qz.com/912055/verizon-values-yahoos-data-
breaches-at-350m-plus-future-headaches/. 
 5  Although the information is not conclusive at the time of writing, current estimates intimate that 143 
million people may have been affected by the data breach. This means that up to sixty percent of Americans 
over the age of 18 may have had very sensitive compromised. Seena Gressin, The Equifax Data Breach: What 
to Do, FED. TRADE COMM’N: CONSUMER INFO. BLOG (Sep. 8, 2017), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/ 
2017/09/equifax-data-breach-what-do; QuickFacts Table, U.S. Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/ 
quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045216. (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 6  1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1.01[1] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.). 
 7  11 U.S.C. § 105 (2012) (“The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title”). 
 8  See Letter from David Vladeck, Director, Fed. Trade Comm’n Bureau of Consumer Prot. to Michael 
Baxter and Yaron Dori (September 14, 2011) [hereinafter Vladeck Letter to Baxter], available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/09/ftc-seeks-protection-personal-customer-information-
borders; Statement of Commissioner Sheila F. Anthony, Toysmart.com, No. X00-0075, No. 00-13995 (CJK) 
(D. Mass. Jul. 21, 2000) [hereinafter Anthony Statement], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
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protecting consumer privacy, data is usually sold for nominal amounts and 
consumer privacy protections are routinely outdated.9 As the amount of data 
collected increases, the concern for consumer privacy must likewise increase, or 
the law will fail to both repay creditors and protect consumers.10 
The 2015 RadioShack bankruptcy presents a good example of the way the 
law currently addresses consumer privacy issues in bankruptcy.11 RadioShack 
sold its intellectual property assets, including its trademarks and the personally 
identifiable information (PII) of 117 million customers.12 The question of 
whether RadioShack could sell customer PII became a point of contention for 
numerous parties, including RadioShack customers, multiple state attorneys 
general, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Apple, Verizon Wireless 
(Verizon), and AT&T.13 On RadioShack’s petition date, its privacy policy 
 
cases/toysmartanthonystatement.htm. But see Statement of Commissioner Mozelle W. Thompson, 
Toysmart.com, No. X00-0075, No. 00-13995 (CJK) (D. Mass. Jul. 21, 2000) [hereinafter Thompson statement] 
(arguing that the proposed sale of consumer data was not inconsistent with Toysmart’s privacy policy), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/toysamrtthompsonstatement.htm.  
 9  In light of the bankruptcy law’s stated aims, the rise in consumer data breaches and the minimal 
valuation of data asset distributions provide evidence of inadequate legal treatment. Conservative estimates 
suggest 25 major data breaches from businesses in 2005. Those totals rose by an average of 141.23 percent each 
year until 2016, despite government efforts to deter and prevent data breaches. Compare Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 232 §§ 231–34, 110 Stat. 23 
(addressing the perceived threats to privacy from the collection and distribution of consumer information, and 
trying to prevent harm from occurring), and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102 §§ 501–27, 113 
Stat. 1338 (1999) (addressing how banks collect, store, and distribute information to prevent harm), and Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191 § 221, 110 Stat. 1936 
(providing safeguards for medical information) with IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CENTER, ITRC BREACH 
STATISTICS 2005–2016 (2017), http://www.idtheftcenter.org/images/breach/2016/Overview2005to2016 
Finalv2.pdf (showing data breaches and the harm to consumer privacy despite attempts at prevention). See, e.g., 
supra note 8; Letter from Jessica Rich, Director, Fed. Trade Comm’n Bureau of Consumer Prot. to Elise Frejka 
(May 16, 2015) [hereinafter Rich Letter], available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_ 
statements/643291/150518radioshackletter.pdf. 
 10  There is a common and growing need to review, address, and manage the collection of consumer 
privacy. See, e.g., Ramirez, supra note 1 (“Experts estimate that, by the year 2020, there will be a 4,300 percent 
annual growth in the amount of data that is collected”). As is common with many goods-turned-commodities, 
there will be those who harvest, refine, or trade in a desired commodity. See, e.g., ACXIOM, 2016 ANNUAL 
REPORT 13 (2016), http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ACXM/3857056437x0x897585/1A5C33C7-9C80-
4621-8B3E-15F7D2C86D5B/ACXM_Annual_Report_FINAL_RRD_Printers_Proof_6-17-16_.pdf (“We offer 
multi-sourced insight into approximately 700 million consumers.”). 
 11  See Rich Letter, supra note 9. On the RadioShack bankruptcy, see generally Alan Wolf, RadioShack: 
A Brief History of Time, TWICE (Feb. 16, 2015), http://www.twice.com/news/retail/radioshack-brief-history-
time/56040. 
 12  Marshall J. Hogan, Customer Data Sale in Bankruptcy: Lessons from RadioShack, LAW360 (July 15, 
2015, 2:03 PM EDT), https://www.law360.com/articles/679550/customer-data-sale-in-bankruptcy-lessons-
from-radioshack. 
 13  Cara Salvatore, RadioShack Gets OK for Data Sale Deal with Verizon, AT&T, LAW360 (Jun. 9, 2015, 
7:46 PM EDT), https://www.law360.com/articles/665356/radioshack-gets-ok-for-data-sale-deal-with-verizon-
at-t; Certification of Counsel Regarding Interim Order Approving Interim Stipulation for Implementation of 
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defined PII and explained how it would be handled.14 The policy included an 
express promise that RadioShack “will not sell or rent [consumer] personally 
identifiable information to anyone at any time.”15 Reinforcing this promise, the 
policy also proclaimed, “We pride ourselves on not selling our private mailing 
list.”16 In light of these promises, it seems intuitive that the court would prevent 
the sale of the PII, yet the ultimate approval of the sale shows otherwise. 
Here, state attorneys general, attempting to mitigate potential privacy harms, 
objected to the sale of PII.17 One of their concerns was how many data points, 
or pieces of information, these records contained.18 In RadioShack’s settlement, 
it agreed to reduce the twenty-one-point data set of customer information to 
seven, removing such information as phone numbers and limiting which e-mail 
addresses were sold.19 Although the settlement was deemed a success, 
enhancements in modern technology enable re-identification and targeting based 
on fewer data points.20 Therefore, the reduction from twenty-one to seven points 
did little to deter future breaches.  
 
Protocols with Verizon and AT&T in Connection with the Transfer of Customer Data to General Wireless, In 
re Radioshack, No. 15-10197 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. 2015), https://consumermediallc.files.wordpress. 
com/2015/06/m042115274439.pdf; John Ribeiro, 25 U.S. states oppose sale of RadioShack’s customer data, 
PCWORLD (Mar. 26, 2015, 5:40 AM). 
 14  Rich Letter, supra note 9. 
 15  “Personally identifiable information may include information that you provide to us by requesting 
information, when registering for special offers or programs or when you buy products online. This may include 
your name, address (including billing and shipping addresses), telephone number, e-mail address, organization, 
city, state and zip code. We may use this information to process and ship orders, to contact you about the status 
of your order, to contact you with answers to your questions, or to provide information about new and exciting 
products, services, promotions and corporate-related information. We may use mailings, telephone calls and e-
mail to contact you . . . . We will not sell or rent your personally identifiable information to anyone at any time.” 
Id. at 2 (quoting RadioShack’s then-current privacy policy). Since at least 2004, the privacy policy had 
specifically claimed that “[RadioShack would] not sell or rent [customers’] personally identifiable information 
to anyone at any time.” Id. at 2, n.5. 
 16  See id. at 3 (citing RadioShack’s privacy policy from 2014). 
 17  Ribiero, supra note 13. 
 18  State of Texas’s Limited Objection to Sale of Personally Identifiable Information of One Hundred 
Seventeen Million Consumers, In re RadioShack Corp., 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 4541 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015), 
https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/1393.pdf. 
 19  Among the concessions, RadioShack limited the e-mail addresses sold to those active within two years 
of petition. Press Release, Eric T. Schneiderman, N.Y. State Attorney Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Announces 
Agreement to Protect Consumer Data in RadioShack Bankruptcy (May 20, 2015), https://ag.ny.gov/press-
release/ag-schneiderman-announces-agreement-protect-consumer-data-radioshack-bankruptcy. 
 20  Although it was not stated as a primary factor, it seemed one concern was that of consumers being 
contacted without consent. The FTC readily admits that modern technology makes it difficult to circumvent 
these concerns. Bikram Bandy, Your Top 5 Questions about Unwanted Calls and the National Do Not Call 
Registry, FED. TRADE COMM’N: CONSUMER INFO. BLOG (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/ 
your-top-5-questions-about-unwanted-calls-and-national-do-not-call-registry (“Current technology makes it 
easy for scammers to fake or ‘spoof’ caller ID information, so the number you reported in your complaint 
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Further, RadioShack collected consumer information pursuant to its privacy 
policy when it sold products and services, including those provided by Verizon, 
Apple, and AT&T.21 When RadioShack filed for bankruptcy and offered to sell 
customer information, all three companies objected to the sale of customer 
information involving their products or services.22 Verizon and AT&T’s 
objections were granted, while customers who purchased Apple products 
through RadioShack saw their information sold.23 This disparate treatment 
raised two questions: What discretionary powers do bankruptcy courts have to 
change, ignore, or enforce privacy policy terms? What factors does the law 
consider when deciding how to handle these sales? 
The court followed the FTC’s recommendations to impose four 
requirements: first, that PII not be sold as a stand-alone asset; second, that the 
buyer be a qualified purchaser engaged in the same line of business as the seller; 
third, that the buyer agree to honor privacy policy terms; and fourth, that the 
privacy policy terms would be altered only with the express consent of 
customers.24 These standards are not unique to In re RadioShack, and, in each 
circumstance, they are aimed at protecting consumer privacy while maximizing 
repayment to creditors. Yet, here and elsewhere, they might accomplish neither. 
While some have advocated addressing the issue legislatively,25 this 
Comment argues that, to protect consumer data while providing redress to 
creditors, bankruptcy courts should expand the use of judicial discretion in both 
chapter 7 and chapter 11 corporate bankruptcy proceedings to consider the future 
value of consumer data when altering contract terms. This expanded use of 
discretion should establish clear liability values for consumer data breaches, 
expand the scope of what constitutes a qualified purchaser, and order the 
destruction of all data not sold before the conclusion of the proceedings. 
Company incentives to secure data involve an analysis that weighs the cost 
of securing the data against the costs that would result from a data breach. 
Bankruptcy courts should perform three market manipulations to increase 
 
probably isn’t real. Without more information, it’s difficult for us to identify the actual caller. Nonetheless, the 
FTC analyzes complaint data to identify illegal callers based on calling patterns. The agency also is pursuing a 
variety of technology-based solutions to combat illegal calls and practices.”). 
 21  Salvatore, supra note 13; Certification of Counsel, supra note 13; Ribiero, supra note 13. 
 22  Salvatore, supra note 13. 
 23  Certification of Counsel, supra note 13; Salvatore, supra note 13. 
 24  Buyer had to agree to be bound by the privacy policy terms that governed the PII when it was acquired. 
Rich Letter, supra note 9, at 5. 
 25  See Kayla Siam, Coming to a Retailer Near You: Consumer Privacy Protection in Retail Bankruptcies, 
33 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 487 (2017). 
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security for consumer data. First, increasing the costs incurred by data breaches 
would increase the incentive to secure data, which in turn would strengthen 
consumer data values. Second, expanding the number of qualified purchasers 
would foster competition among buyers. Third, destroying unsold data would 
preclude later purchases by those unwilling to protect it and would decrease the 
available supply. These market manipulations of the supply-demand curve 
would increase the value of data and thus result in greater redress to creditors. 
At the same time, an increased incentive to secure consumer data would likely 
produce beneficial externalities, such as increased consumer awareness of 
privacy concerns. 
This Comment will begin by demonstrating how the organic development of 
the law has failed to keep pace with rapid technological advancements. 
Throughout the discussion, this Comment will establish how the law balances 
consumer privacy concerns with economic interests in legislation, regulation, 
and jurisprudence. The Comment will then discuss the extent to which 
bankruptcy courts can alter contract terms through judicial discretion. Finally, 
the Comment will conclude by offering a solution to protect privacy while 
increasing redress to creditors by changing how bankruptcy courts use judicial 
discretion. 
I. PRIVACY OUTPACED BY TECHNOLOGY 
The legal system generally treats privacy less as an entitlement to be 
positively asserted than as a right whose violation opens the door to redress. In 
fact, privacy originated as a value to be preserved through negative rights that 
developed organically throughout history.26 Over time, ex ante prohibitions were 
introduced to guard citizens from unconstitutional invasions by the government, 
while ex post remedies compensated victims of privacy harms.27 Even today, 
there is no standard treatment of privacy rights despite the growing need.28 
 
 26  See, e.g., William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960); RUTH MACKAY, THE BAKER 
WHO PRETENDED TO BE KING OF PORTUGAL (2012) (in feudal times, Gabriel de Espinosa was sentenced to death 
for impersonating the late King Sebastian of Portugal); Ross A. Thompson, Vulnerability in Research: A 
Developmental Perspective on Research Risk, 1991 ANNUAL PROGRESS IN CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND CHILD DEV. 
119, 135 (Stella Chess & Margaret E. Hertzig eds., 1991) (positing that privacy is a step in self-identity and 
“[p]rivacy interests and concerns increase and become more differentiated as children mature, and broaden from 
an initial focus on physical and possessional privacy to include concerns with informational privacy”).  
 27  See Nehf, supra note 2, at 30–31, 33–34.  
 28  FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK 2–3 (Feb. 2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/consumer-sentinel-network-data-book-january-december-
2015/160229csn-2015databook.pdf (the FTC discusses the prolific threat of identity theft, and notes that over 
three million complaints of appropriation were lodged from 2013 to 2015). Compare 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1) 
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A. Early Scholarship and Cases 
Privacy can be viewed as a positive right to be protected or as a negative 
right enforced through a legal remedy.29 Early scholarship included Warren and 
Brandeis’s The Right to Privacy and William Prosser’s Privacy, which illustrate 
the divergent perspectives.30 Warren and Brandeis argued that privacy should be 
a right to be enjoyed,31 while Prosser saw the issue as embodying four torts that 
offer remedies for privacy violations.32 The distinction turns on whether the aim 
is to prevent harm or to provide redress.33  
Privacy as a positive right involves the option of requesting government 
intervention and enforcement before a harm occurs.34 Member states of the 
European Union provide the option of enforcing this positive right on 
unnecessary use of personal data,35 while citizens retain negative rights to 
 
(2012) (“The bankruptcy court, for cause, may protect an individual, with respects to the following types of 
information to the extent the court finds that disclosure of such information would create undue risk of identity 
theft or other unlawful injury . . .”); and 11 U.S.C. § 332 (2012); and 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012); and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1028(d)(7) (2012); and FED. R. BANKR. P. 9037; and Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
(BAPCPA) Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §§ 231–34, 110 Stat. 23 (in each of the aforementioned laws, 
consumer privacy protections are intended to be protected ex-ante, to prevent appropriation) with RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652A(2) (1979) (“The right of privacy is invaded by (a) unreasonable intrusion upon the 
seclusion of another, as stated in § 652B; or (b) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness, as stated in § 652C; 
or (c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life, as stated in § 652D; or (d) publicity that 
unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public, as stated in § 652E.”). 
 29  See Nehf, supra note 2, at 5–6; Prosser, supra note 26; Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 486–
88 (1968); DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES 7–9 (1989). 
 30  Compare Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205–
06, 213–20 (1890), with William L. Prosser, supra note 26. 
 31  Warren & Brandeis, supra note 30, at 211 (“[N]ow that modern devices afford abundant opportunities 
for the perpetration of such wrongs without any participation by the injured party, the protection granted by the 
law must be placed upon a broader foundation.”). 
 32  Prosser, supra note 26 (establishing four torts for the invasion of privacy: “[i]ntrusion upon the 
plaintiff’s . . . solitude, . . . public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff . . . publicity which 
places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye[, and] [a]ppropriation . . . of the plaintiff’s name or likeness”). 
 33  The different vantage points, and their corresponding effects on what is instituted, are most clearly 
illustrated by criminal law and the difference between utilitarian and retributive theories of justice. Namely, the 
difference lies in that the former seeks to deter future harm, while the latter seeks to punish. Both aim to address 
crime, albeit through distinctly different methods. See, e.g., John Bronsteen, Retribution’s Role, 84 IND. L.J. 
1129, 1131–33 (2009); Gerard V. Bradley, Retribution: The Central Aim of Punishment, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 19, 30 (2003) (“[R]etribution attempts to restore social balance instead of seeking only to discourage 
similar criminal behavior.”). 
 34  The right to be forgotten, as asserted in Europe, is illustrative of this. See Press Release No 70/14, Court 
of Justice of the European Union, Judgment in Case C-131/12 (May 13, 2014), available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-05/cp140070en.pdf (“[T]he Court holds that a fair 
balance should be sought in particular between that interest and the data subject’s fundamental rights, in 
particular the right to privacy and the right to protection of personal data.”). 
 35  EUR. COMM’N, Factsheet on the “Right to be Forgotten” Ruling (2014), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/ 
data-protection/files/factsheets/factsheet_data_protection_en.pdf. 
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remedies.36 These comprehensive laws are a relatively new replacement to what 
had been a patchwork of legal treatments.37 
United States privacy law still operates on an organically developed 
framework founded on negative rights.38 Privacy violations are generally 
remedied through tort actions and, in limited circumstances, the law grants 
positive rights, such as the protection against search and seizure.39 Advancing 
technology inspired legal developments through litigation as opposed to 
legislation.40 
While technology spurred early privacy law, jurists’ responses to 
technological changes lagged behind technological developments. Courts 
initially did not find protections for intrusions of privacy analogous to those that 
existed for physical intrusions, nor did they foresee how privacy threats would 
continue to mount. Brandeis, however, excelled where his peers failed, and his 
fear that “what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-
tops” preceded decades of legal developments.41  
In Olmstead v. United States, the Supreme Court faced the question of 
whether the warrantless wiretapping of a citizen’s home violated the Fourth 
Amendment.42 The majority held that there was no violation of constitutional 
protections because there was no seizure of physical effects nor physical 
invasion of the home.43 Brandeis presciently dissented in Olmstead: “But ‘time 
works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.’ Subtler and 
 
 36  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 1, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679; Directive 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by 
competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA.., 2016 O.J. (L 119) 89, 1, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ 
PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016L0680. 
 37  See Regulation (EU) 2016/679, supra note 36, at 89. 
 38  From wiretapping in Katz to digital collection of children’s information, privacy has developed as a 
response to stimulus. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 357–59 (1967); Fed. Press Release, 
Federal Trade Commission, FTC Announces Settlement With Bankrupt Website, Toysmart.com, Regarding 
Alleged Privacy Policy Violations (July 21, 2000) [hereinafter Toysmart Press Release], https://www.ftc. 
gov/news-events/press-releases/2000/07/ftc-announces-settlement-bankrupt-website-toysmartcom-regarding. 
 39  For an overview of privacy law, see generally Nehf, supra note 2, at 29–58. 
 40  See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 357–59; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456–57, 464–66 
(1928); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Toysmart, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21963, at *1 (D. Mass. 2000). 
 41  See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 30, at 195. 
 42  Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455. 
 43  Id. at 466. 
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more far-reaching means of invading privacy have now become available to the 
government.”44 Here, he saw what others did not: technology was outpacing the 
law.  
After nearly four decades of failing to recognize non-physical invasions, the 
Court held in Griswold v. Connecticut that “the First Amendment has a 
penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion,” which 
affirmed the right to privacy.45 Two years later, in Katz v. United States, the 
Court removed physical intrusion as a requirement for an invasion of privacy.46 
History reflects the law’s sluggish progression when compared to the alacrity 
with which technology advances. For example, in the forty years that the law 
had taken to recognize, in Katz, that wiretapping falls within the Fourth 
Amendment, televisions had become widespread and video recording equipment 
had become available for home use.47 This disparate rate of the development of 
law and technology persists into the digital age of “[s]ubtler and more far-
reaching means of invading privacy.”48 While Brandeis wrestled with 
wiretapping a private home, today, our information is tracked on a scale 
previously unimagined.49 The digital age introduced a host of legal issues such 
as the distribution of consumer data as a bankruptcy asset. 
B. FTC v. Toysmart 
FTC v. Toysmart is the seminal case addressing consumer privacy policies 
and consumer data sold in bankruptcy.50 Prior to its bankruptcy filing in 2000, 
 
 44  Id. at 473. 
 45  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965). 
 46  See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466; Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 359 (wiretapping criminal acts in a public phone 
booth qualified as a search and seizure). 
 47  See Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438; Katz, 389 U.S. 347; COBBETT STEINBERG, TV FACTS (1980) (prevalence 
of television sets in American households). 
 48  Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473. Comparing legal development and technology shows the disparity of pace. 
See, e.g., Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455, 466 (physical intrusion was required for illegal search and seizure, yet 
wiretapping already existed); Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 359 (wiretapping was finally considered an invasion, but 
TV broadcasts were now common and home video technology had been released); Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191 § 221, 110 Stat. 1936 (addressing the need to 
store private health information, but falling behind the widespread use of the internet); Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102 §§ 501–27, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (conceiving notice and consent, but seemingly 
ignorant of the widespread use of the internet and growing cellular market); Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCA), Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 232, 110 Stat. 23; Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
Toysmart, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21963 (D. Mass. Aug. 21, 2000) (responding to the collection and distribution 
of consumer data from online customer accounts, without acknowledging the widespread collection of metadata 
and the ease of re-identification). 
 49  Mark Mulcahy, Big Data Statistics & Facts for 2017, WATERFORD TECHNOLOGIES (Feb. 22, 2017), 
https://www.waterfordtechnologies.com/big-data-interesting-facts/. 
 50  See Rich Letter, supra note 9; Vladeck Letter, supra note 8. 
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Toysmart.com advertised, promoted, and sold toys to adults and children.51 The 
collected names, addresses, and shopping history of Toysmart customers were 
offered for sale in bankruptcy, contrary to the terms of the company’s privacy 
policy.52 Through their combined efforts, the FTC and the bankruptcy court 
confronted the unauthorized collection of children’s data and resolved the issue 
of the sale of customer data contrary to the Toysmart.com privacy policy.53 
Toysmart.com customers purchased goods under privacy policy terms that 
dictated “[p]ersonal information voluntarily submitted by visitors to our site, 
such as name, address, billing information and shopping preferences, is never 
shared with a third party.”54 Therefore, allowing the sale of this consumer 
information would seem to contravene the contractual obligations arising under 
the privacy policy.55 FTC Commissioners Anthony and Thompson believed, 
however, that restricting how and to whom the information could be sold would 
address consumer privacy interests, maximize repayment to creditors, and 
provide a satisfactory compromise between those concerns.56 Consumer privacy 
interests would be protected through data anonymization and creditors would be 
served by the sale of the data. Therefore, this perspective supported a looser 
interpretation of contract terms. 
FTC Commissioner Swindle conceded that the proposed compromise was 
better than allowing a completely unrestricted sale of the information, but he 
ultimately dissented on grounds that the bankruptcy order should enforce the 
company’s promise never to sell customer information to a third party.57 In a 
footnote, he added that he would have supported the majority position if 
 
 51  Toysmart Press Release, supra note 38. 
 52  Id. 
 53  Id.; see also Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (providing 
protection to children surfing the internet); Toysmart.com Privacy Policy, TOYSMART.COM, http:www.ftc.gov/ 
os/2000/07/toyexh1.pdf (“Personal information voluntarily submitted by visitors to our site, such as name, 
address, billing information and shopping preferences, is never shared with a third party.”).  
 54  Toysmart Press Release, supra note 38; Toysmart.com Privacy Policy, supra note 53. 
 55  Toysmart Press Release, supra note 38; Toysmart Privacy Policy, supra note 53; see also U.C.C. § 2-
206 (amended 2002) (offer and acceptance in formation of contracts requires offer and acceptance); Stipulation 
and Order Establishing Conditions on Sale of Customer Information, No. 00-13995 (CJK) (D. Mass. Jul. 20, 
2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/toysmartconsent.htm (ruling that Toysmart 
violated 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012) “by disclosing, selling or offering for sale personal customer information, 
contrary to the terms of its privacy policy that personal information would never be disclosed to third parties”). 
 56  See Anthony Statement, supra note 8; Thompson Statement, supra note 8.  
 57  Statement of Commissioner Orson Swindle, Toysmart.com, No. X00-0075, No. 00-13995 (CJK) (D. 
Mass. Jul. 21, 2000) [hereinafter Swindle Statement] (“Toysmart promised its customers that their personal 
information would never be sold to a third party, but the Bankruptcy Order in fact would allow a sale to a third 
party. In my view, such a sale should not be permitted because ‘never’ really means never.”). 
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customers had been given adequate notice and willingly consented to the terms 
presented in the bankruptcy order.58 The FTC’s decision thereby prioritized 
creditors’ economic redress above consumers’ privacy.59 This set a precedent 
that allowed bankruptcy courts to alter privacy agreements in two ways: (1) 
privacy policies could still allow the transfer of consumer data to a third party, 
if it was done through estate distribution in bankruptcy, and (2) courts could now 
alter privacy contracts to bind parties to new terms or to new parties. 
II. CURRENT LEGAL SOLUTIONS TO PRIVACY PROBLEMS 
Congressional and regulatory oversight of consumer privacy began a few 
years after Griswold and Katz were decided in 1965 and 1967.60 Laws such as 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (FCRA), the Privacy Act of 1974, the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), and the Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) each focus 
on different sectors of information.61 Although the FTC has been delegated the 
authority to protect consumers and their privacy, these acts represent further 
legislative guidance. Here, Congress defined personal information differently 
for each sector, which in turn limits what the FTC can consider sensitive 
information that it is charged to protect.62 
A. Privacy Laws 
In 1970, Congress delegated authority to protect consumer privacy to the 
FTC through the FCRA.63 This act was the first federal law regulating the use of 
 
 58  Id. at n.1 (“If Toysmart had obtained the consent of its customers to a sale of the customer lists to a 
buyer that met the specific conditions spelled out in the Bankruptcy Order, I would have had no objection to the 
sale.”). 
 59  Toysmart Press Release, supra note 38. 
 60  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (recognizing that “Constitutional guarantees,” 
including the Fifth Amendment, create a “zone of privacy” encompassing married couples’ use of 
contraceptives); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 359 (1967) (holding that the Fifth Amendment protects 
against searches that invade reasonable expectations of privacy). 
 61  The laws listed are not exhaustive but do provide an illustrative sample of legislative treatment. See, 
e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012); Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012); 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936; 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6505 (2012); Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-8, §§ 231–34, 110 Stat. 23. 
 62  The FTC recognizes a consensus that data—such as that collected from children, financial transactions, 
health information, and social security numbers—comprises sensitive information, which should require notice 
of terms by the company and consent from the customer. PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 1, at 58–59. 
 63  The FTC regulates consumer reporting agencies and limits the use of information collected, such as 
credit history and payment patterns, as well as demographic and identifying information. See Fair Credit 
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personal information by private businesses and it sought to promote the 
accuracy, fairness, and privacy of consumer information in the growing credit 
reporting industry.64 By collecting large amounts of private data, credit reporting 
agencies became a powerful force in expanding credit availability and promoting 
economic efficiency.65 However, to ensure accuracy and prevent abuse, the FTC 
required that consumers be notified and give consent before information is 
collected.66 Although the act was pivotal in considering both consumer privacy 
and economic efficiency, it covered only a small sphere of consumer privacy. 
Subsequent legislation aimed to expand protection in other sectors of business 
while simultaneously promoting economic efficiency. In a rare instance of legal 
foresight, Congress safeguarded against deficiencies in future legislation by 
granting the FTC the authority to devise regulatory stop-gap measures. 
The increasing rate at which government agencies were collecting, 
maintaining, and disseminating personal records prompted the Privacy Act of 
1974.67 Congress barred the communication of personal information to any 
person or agency without the express consent of the person involved, although 
exceptions were carved out for the operation of the government.68 The Act was 
updated in an attempt to keep up with advancing technology, such as the 1988 
and 1990 updates to address the growth of computer usage.69 Having 
demonstrated its intent to safeguard privacy against government intrusion, 
Congress turned its attention to other areas of priority during the 1990s. 
Congress passed HIPAA to combat abuse of Protected Health Information 
(PHI).70 In 1995, an estimated 84.6 percent of the U.S. population was reportedly 
covered by some form of health insurance, which helped meet the demands of 
 
Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681; FED. TRADE COMM’N, 40 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE WITH THE FAIR 
CREDIT REPORTING ACT, AN FTC STAFF REPORT WITH SUMMARY OF INTERPRETATIONS 1 (July 2011), 
[hereinafter FTC STAFF REPORT], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/40-years-
experience-fair-credit-reporting-act-ftc-staff-report-summary-interpretations/110720fcrareport.pdf. 
 64  See Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
 65  See MARK FURLETTI, FED. RESERVE BANK OF PHILA., An Overview and History of Credit Reporting 
4–6 (Jun. 2002), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/consumer-credit-and-payments/payment-cards-center/ 
publications/discussion-papers/2002/CreditReportingHistory_062002.pdf; Rowena Olegario, Credit-Reporting 
Agencies: Their Historical Roots, Current Status, and Role in Market Development 8–9 (World Bank, Working 
Paper No. 27825, 2001), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/477365-1257315064764/ 
2429_olegario.pdf. 
 66  FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 63, at 2. 
 67  See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012). 
 68  Id. 
 69  Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388. 
 70  Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 
1936. 
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the aging baby boomers.71 As the number of participants in healthcare increased, 
so did the attempts to take advantage of them.72 In response, the law’s heavy 
regulatory scheme seemingly prioritized consumer privacy concerns over 
economic efficiency.73 This trade-off may have been shortsighted, however, 
considering that National Healthcare Expenditure (NHE) accounted for 12.7 
percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1995, reaching $957.8 billion.74 It 
then grew to approximately $3.3 trillion, accounting for 17.9 percent of U.S. 
GDP in 2016.75  
HIPAA protects consumer privacy by placing strictures on how companies 
can store and transfer consumer data.76 Since customers can trust that the transfer 
of data from one company to another will follow these more secure protocols, 
consumers may be less fearful about changing providers of insurance or 
healthcare, which bolsters market competition. Furthermore, HIPAA assigns 
both positive and negative rights to PHI.77 It sets security standards to protect 
PHI as a positive right, and it enforces the negative right by punishing misuse, 
abuse, or lack of security.78 Healthcare fraud and abuse cost an estimated $100 
billion in 1995 and rose to $260 billion in 2012.79 Here, the fact that 84.6 percent 
 
 71  Population Profile of the United States 4, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (1997), https://www.census.gov/ 
prod/3/98pubs/p23-194.pdf. 
 72  Health Care Fraud Report, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1–2 (Oct. 27, 1997), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/us-department-justice-health-care-fraud-report. 
 73  Meredith Kapushion, Hungry Hungry HIPAA: When Privacy Regulations Go Too Far, 31 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1483, 1502 (“HIPAA’s high costs, questionable benefits, and numerous economic, legal, and 
administrative consequences make a strong case for repeal.”). 
 74  Cathy A. Cowan & Bradley R. Braden, Business Households and Government: Healthcare Spending, 
1995, 18 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 195, 196 (1997); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS, NATIONAL 
HEALTH EXPENDITURES 2015, HIGHLIGHTS, https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/ 
statistics-trends-and-reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/downloads/highlights.pdf; United States GDP Data from 
the World Economic Outlook Database, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Oct. 2016), http://www.imf.org/external/ 
pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=25&pr.y=9&sy=2015&ey=2020&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=cou
ntry&ds=.&br=1&c=111&s=NGDPD%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPGDP%2CPPPPC&grp=0&a=#download. 
 75  Cowan, supra note 74; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS, supra note 74; United States GDP 
Data, supra note 74. 
 76  45 C.F.R. § 164.530 (2012). 
 77  Id. 
 78  Id. 
 79  COMM. ON GOV’T. REFORM AND OVERSIGHT, HEALTH CARE FRAUD: ALL PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
PAYERS NEED FEDERAL CRIMINAL ANTI-FRAUD PROTECTIONS, H. R. REP. NO. 104-747 (1996) (“Health care 
fraud [is], by some estimates, a $100 billion problem.”), https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/104th-
congress/house-report/747/1; Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Louisiana, 
Medicare Fraud Strike Force Charges 107 Individuals for Approximately $452 Million in False Billing (May 2, 
2012) (“The United States spends more than $2.5 trillion on health care annually and rough estimates indicate 
that anywhere from 3 to 10 percent of all health care expenditures are attributed to fraud”), 
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/neworleans/press-releases/2012/medicare-fraud-strike-force-charges-107-
individuals-for-approximately-452-million-in-false-billing. 
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of the U.S. population faced privacy threats, and nearly 12.7 percent of domestic 
GDP faced hundreds of billions in financial harm, add substantial support to the 
notion that pecuniary interests were at play in congressional intent. 
In 1998, Congress passed COPPA to protect the privacy of children younger 
than 13.80 Children faced increased marketing attention at home and in schools.81 
Congress was concerned about online advertising in the 1990s because the 
interactivity of the medium posed a new threat.82 To mitigate the risk of harm, 
COPPA requires parental consent, establishes privacy policy standards, and site 
operation guidelines.83 The FTC addresses any statutory gaps.84 After market 
adoption in 2002, 90 percent of websites provided notice, but only 
approximately half properly handled the information collected.85  
Here, congressional intent focused on protecting children’s privacy and 
placed a lower priority on economic considerations than on parental control.86 
However, the act applies only to websites that direct their operations at children 
or websites that possess actual knowledge that the information collected belongs 
to children.87 These measures are mostly ineffective since websites can either 
target children without collecting personal information or collect information 
from users who do not self-identify as children.88 Although Congress intended 
 
 80  Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2012). 
 81  Channel One gave schools free audiovisual equipment and services, which allowed it to advertise to 
millions of children for two minutes a day. See Drew Tiene, Channel One: Good or Bad News for Our Schools?, 
50 CHANGING CURRICULUM 46, (May 1993). Billions of dollars were spent in the 1990s on marketing to 
children. JAMES MCNEAL, THE KIDS MARKET: MYTH AND REALITIES, 14–15 (1999). 
 82  See Angela J. Campbell, Ads2Kids.com: Should Government Regulate Advertising to Children on the 
World Wide Web?, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 311, 325–27 (1997–1998) (discussing the myriad methods that advertisers 
used to target children at the time). 
 83  15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2012). 
 84  Id. § 6505. 
 85  FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CHILDREN’S PRIVACY UNDER COPPA: A SURVEY ON COMPLIANCE 
15 (Apr. 2002), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/rules/children%E2%80%99s-online-privacy-
protection-rule-coppa/coppasurvey.pdf. 
 86  15 U.S.C. § 6502 (2012). 
 87  Lauren A. Matecki, Update: COPPA is Ineffective Legislation! Next Steps for Protecting Youth Privacy 
Rights in the Social Networking Era, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y. 369, 387 (2010) (“These screening methods are 
technologically ineffective, as computer-savvy children often know how to circumvent these attempted 
roadblocks. The ease of age falsification leads to a situation where children may share personal information on 
a website that seeks to operate outside of COPPA restrictions because it—officially—doesn’t allow underage 
users.”). 
 88  15 U.S.C. §§ 6501, 6502(b)(1)(A) (“ . . . require the operator of any website or online service directed 
to children that collects personal information from children or the operator of a website or online service that 
has actual knowledge that it is collecting personal information from a child.”). 
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to protect children’s privacy, the law contains large gaps that FTC regulations 
have yet to address.89 
In 1999, the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act (or “GLBA”)90 repealed restrictions 
of the Glass-Steagall Act,91 thus permitting insurance and bank holding 
companies to merge and enabling the formation of Citigroup.92 The GLBA’s 
preamble states its purpose is “[t]o enhance the competition in the financial 
services industry by providing a prudential framework for the affiliation of 
banks, securities firms, insurance companies, and other financial services 
providers, and for other purposes,” which clearly shows that economic interests 
governed legislative intent.93 In addition to promoting the economy, however, 
the GLBA’s anticipation of potential privacy harms, stemming from the creation 
of the first “universal” bank in America, created compliance standards for 
financial privacy, safeguards, and pretexting protections.94 These privacy rules 
operate under notice and consent frameworks.95  
Although Congress put some safeguards in place for consumer privacy, 
those protections failed to recognize the increased threat posed by a single entity 
holding so much data.96 The Citigroup merger consolidated the insurance and 
financial records of millions of customers, which increased the risk of harm 
posed by a data breach. Economic concerns were certainly paramount, but the 
notice and consent provisions in the act demonstrate that Congress did not 
completely ignore consumer privacy concerns, even if it failed to properly 
protect them. 
 
 89  See generally Matecki, supra note 87. 
 90 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801−09 (2012); Federal Reserve History, Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, 
commonly called Gram-Leach-Bliley (Nov. 12, 1999) (“This legislation, signed into law by President Bill 
Clinton in November 1999, repealed large parts of the Glass-Steagall Act, which had separated commercial and 
investment banking since 1933. This led to the creation of financial holding companies, over which the Fed was 
granted new supervisory powers”), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/gramm_leach_bliley_act. 
 91  Act of Feb. 27, 1932, ch. 58, Pub. L. No. 72–44, 47 Stat. 56; Act of June 15, 1933, 6573–66. Glass-
Steagall Act, ch. 88, Pub. L. No. 73-65, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (providing for the safer and more effective use of 
bank assets). 
 92  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801−09 (2012) (enhancing competition in the financial services). 
 93  Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).  
 94  See 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b) (2012) (financial privacy rule and safeguards rule); 15 U.S.C. §§ 6821(a)–(b) 
(2012) (pretexting protection). Merging Citicorp and Travelers resulted in a banking, securities, and insurance 
service. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Citigroup: A Case Study in Managerial and Regulatory Failures, 47 IND. 
L. REV. 69, 70–71 (2014) (“[S]upporters of the merger hailed Citigroup as the first modern American ‘universal 
bank’ . . . . “). 
 95  See 15 U.S.C. § 6802 (2012). 
 96  E.g., Tom Zeller, Jr., Personal Data for 3.9 Million Lost in Transit, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 7, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/07/business/personal-data-for-39-million-lost-in-transit.html (the United 
Parcel Service had lost in transit a box of computer tapes containing information on 3.9 million customers for 
the consumer finance subsidiary of Citigroup) (hereinafter Zeller). 
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Despite the intent to promote economic efficiency, the FCRA, the Privacy 
Act of 1974, and HIPAA all managed to address consumer privacy interests, 
perhaps due to each Act’s particular subject matter. Both the Privacy Act of 1974 
and HIPAA specifically addressed consumer information, while the FCRA and 
GLBA addressed economic efficiency. The FCRA promoted economic 
efficiency by regulating credit reporting, while the GLBA promoted economic 
efficiency by allowing the consolidation of businesses and peripherally 
addressing data.97  
BAPCPA amended the Code to address privacy concerns and system 
abuse.98 The act added the presumption of abuse,99 mandated two years between 
filings,100 and required credit counseling to qualify for protection.101 Privacy 
protections within BAPCPA addressed the treatment of PII102 and created a 
consumer privacy ombudsman.103  
Provisions in BAPCPA mirror the FTC and bankruptcy court’s prerequisites 
to selling consumer data laid out in Toysmart.104 The court in Toysmart, which 
stated that “in the absence of overruling federal law, [the decision] is to be 
determined by reference to state law,”105 seemingly should have honored state 
 
 97 Privacy Act of 1974, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (July 17, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/opcl/privacy-act-1974 (The act specifically references information gathered by federal 
agencies, the term “consumer” here is referencing the citizens who information is collected); Summary of the 
HIPAA Security Rule, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2018) 
(describing how HIPAA protects health information about actual persons); Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 
Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-84/pdf/STATUTE-84-Pg1114-
2.pdf (every instance of information gathering specifically addresses the growing need for standardized data 
collection and distribution for the changing infrastructure of 1970); Fed. Trade Comm’n, Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act (Sep. 4, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/privacy-and-security/gramm-leach-bliley-
act (“The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires financial institutions—companies that offer consumers financial 
products or services like loans, financial or investment advice, or insurance—to explain their information-
sharing practices to their customers and to safeguard sensitive data”). 
 98  See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-
8, § 232, 119 Stat. 72. 
 99  11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2012). 
 100  Id. § 727. 
 101  Id. § 109(h). 
 102  Id. § 363 (b)(1). 
 103  Id. § 332. 
 104  Both Toysmart and BAPCPA allow for the transfer of consumer data contrary to prior obligations, with 
restrictions on alienation. Compare F.T.C. v. Toysmart.com, LLC, No. 00-CV-11341-RGS, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 21963 (D. Mass. Aug. 21, 2000), with Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 232, 119 Stat. 72.  
 105  Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161 (1946); cf. Swindle Statement, 
supra note 57. 
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contract law. Instead, the court held that debtors could sell consumer information 
under limitations similar to those later set forth in BAPCPA.106 One of the 
limitations in both BAPCPA and Toysmart is the requirement that assets that 
contain personally or directly identifiable information—such as names, 
addresses, telephone numbers, or account numbers—be sold only to a qualified 
purchaser.107  
The trial court in Toysmart required a qualified purchaser to (1) be in a 
related market, (2) continue to operate in the related market, and (3) agree to 
abide by the Toysmart.com privacy policy, unless customers gave affirmative 
consent before any material changes were made.108 These requirements predated 
and inspired § 363(b)(1), which mirrors Toysmart by stating that PII can be sold 
only if the sale or lease is consistent with governing privacy policy terms, or if 
an appointed consumer privacy ombudsman approves the sale after notice and a 
hearing.109 The consumer privacy ombudsman decides whether to approve the 
sale after considering the cost to consumer privacy, much as the FTC did in 
Toysmart. 
BAPCPA clearly mirrors Toysmart in that consumer data can be sold only 
pursuant to governing privacy policies or if the consumer privacy ombudsman 
approves the sale after considering how it might affect consumer privacy. 
Congress relies on the FTC’s regulatory authority to protect consumer privacy 
against threats from gaps in statutory protections.110 Just as the FTC advised the 
court in Toysmart, BAPCPA intended the consumer privacy ombudsman to 
serve a similar advisory role.111 Although BAPCPA contains measures to protect 
consumer privacy, technology has outpaced those protections. 
B. Balancing Creditor Interests and Privacy 
Bankruptcy courts and the FTC possess broad discretion over the sale of 
personal customer data in corporate bankruptcy filings,112 both must consider 
 
 106  See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-
8, § 232, 119 Stat. 72. 
 107  Id.  
 108  F.T.C. v. Toysmart.com, LLC, No. 00-CV-11341-RGS, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21963. 
 109  11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2012); see 11 U.S.C. § 332 (2012). 
 110  See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2012). See generally 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2012). 
 111 11 U.S.C. § 332 (2012) (“The consumer privacy ombudsman may appear and be heard at such hearing 
and shall provide to the court information to assist the court in its consideration of the facts, circumstances, and 
conditions of the proposed sale or lease of personally identifiable information under section 363(b)(1)(B)”). 
 112  See, e.g., In re Tweeter Home Ent. Grp., No. 07-10787 (PJW), 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3418, (Bankr. D. 
Del. Oct. 2, 2007); Letter from David Vladeck, Dir., Fed. Trade Comm’n Bureau of Consumer Prot. to Peter 
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the circumstances of the sale, consumers’ privacy interests, and the financial 
interests of creditors.113 Toysmart, the seminal case in these matters, gave 
priority to creditor interests over consumer privacy concerns and allowed for the 
sale of information.114 Bankruptcy courts and the FTC have since decided other 
cases by altering or ignoring contract terms, with varied methods and results. 
In 2007, In re Tweeter displayed how a bankruptcy court’s discretion can 
extend privacy policies beyond express limitations.115 Tweeter Home 
Entertainment Group’s online privacy policy specifically excluded retail and 
phone operations by stating that it covered “personal information collected via 
this Web site, and not through any other activities of Tweeter or its affiliates or 
business partners.”116 Since the proposed sale of all customer data collected 
would operate contrary to the privacy policy, 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) required that 
a consumer privacy ombudsman be appointed to determine whether to allow the 
sale. The ombudsman and the FTC ignored the stated exclusions and 
recommended that Tweeter’s policy extend to all three sales channels. The court 
agreed with these recommendations and sold all of Tweeter’s PII. Thus, its 
decision outright altered contract terms to provide redress to creditors.117 
In 2010, XY.com and XY Magazine filed for bankruptcy, and to prevent 
potential harm to customers, they were not allowed to sell PII.118 During the 
case, concerns were raised about how customer information would be handled. 
Under § 363(b)(1), an ombudsman was appointed because the privacy policy 
would be violated by the proposed sale.119 There, the FTC argued that customers 
had consented to have their information used only to operate XY.com and XY 
 
Larson et al. (July 1, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/100712xy.pdf) [hereinafter Vladeck Letter to 
Larson]; cf. In re Borders Grp., 453 B.R. 459 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 113  11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012). 
 114  Although the sale was allowed, it was not without objection. Commissioner Swindle said, “Toysmart 
promised its customers that their personal information would never be sold to a third party, but the Bankruptcy 
Order in fact would allow a sale to a third party. In my view, such a sale should not be permitted because ‘never’ 
really means never.” See Swindle Statement, supra note 57.  
 115  See In re Tweeter Home Ent. Grp., No. 07-10787 (PJW), 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3418 (Bankr. D. Del. 
Oct. 2, 2007). 
 116  Id. 
 117  Id. 
 118  Vladeck Letter to Larson, supra note 112. 
 119 CONSENT ORDER DIRECTING THE APPOINTMENT OF A CONSUMER PRIVACY OMBUDSMAN PURSUANT 
TO 11 U.S.C. § 332, Case No. 10-1443 (MBK), Doc. 77-1 (July 23, 2010), https://www.eff.org/files/consent_ 
order_ombudsman.pdf; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 332, 363 (2012) (Section 332 explains the duties of an ombudsman, 
while § 363 delineates the appointment of an ombudsman).  
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Magazine. The purchaser countered that the sale should be allowed since he 
planned to restart both companies. 120 
In response, the FTC argued that “[d]ue to the nature of the information, the 
passage of time, and the closure of the magazine and website in 2007 and 2009, 
respectively, the continued use of the data may pose privacy risks not reasonably 
contemplated by subscribers . . . .”121 The purchaser could not provide sufficient 
guarantees that information would be used with the same limitations as in XY’s 
prior operations. In this case, the court placed greater value on consumer privacy 
concerns, since XY’s customers could potentially face harm due to the sale of 
their data. As a result, unlike in Toysmart and Tweeter, consumer privacy 
concerns were given priority over creditor interests, and the court ordered the 
destruction of all of the PII.122  
In 2011, the Borders bookstore chain was not allowed to sell its customers’ 
personal information unless it honored its promise not to do so without their 
consent.123 Borders’ privacy policy, in 2006 and 2007, promised that it would 
disclose information to third parties only if the customer expressly consented to 
such disclosure.124 Borders amended its policy on May 27, 2008, however, to 
allow the sale of consumer data in bankruptcy without express consent: 
Circumstances may arise where for strategic or other business reasons, 
Borders decides to sell, purchase, merge or otherwise reorganize its 
own or other businesses. Such a transaction may involve the disclosure 
of personal or other information to prospective or actual purchasers, or 
receiving it from sellers. It is Borders’ practice to seek appropriate 
protection for information in these types of transactions. In the event 
that Borders or all of its assets are acquired in such a transaction, 
customer information would be one of the transferred assets.125 
The FTC commissioner refused to accept the amended language applied to 
chapter 7 dissolutions and concluded that it should apply only to continuing 
operations, such as a merger or chapter 11 restructuring.126 Since this was a 
chapter 7 filing, the privacy policy terms barred the sale, and 11 U.S.C. 
 
 120 11 U.S.C. §§ 332, 363 (2012) 
 121  Id.  
 122  Id. 
 123  In re Borders Grp., No. 11-10614 (MG), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 4606 (U.S. Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 
2011). 
 124  Vladeck Letter to Baxter, supra note 8. 
 125  See id. 
 126 See id. (“We view this provision as applying to business transactions that would allow Borders to 
continue operating as a going concern and not to the dissolution of the company and piecemeal sale of assets in 
bankruptcy.”). 
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§ 363(b)(1) again required the appointment of a consumer privacy ombudsman. 
The ombudsman and the FTC recommended that Borders seek express consent 
from customers before selling PII, and the court agreed. Customers who did not 
consent to the sale would have their PII purged.127  
 The FTC recognized that “bankruptcy may present special 
circumstances,”128 and recommended the sale be allowed under BAPCPA 
conditions.129 The bankruptcy court believed that Borders should be allowed to 
“marshal remaining assets for its creditors” by selling consumer information.130 
Barnes and Noble (B&N) was allowed to buy Borders’ IP assets for $13.9 
million so long as it conformed to the express consent policy.131 This amount 
may seem significant, but B&N paid only about $0.35 for each consumer record 
purchased.132 
In 2014, ConnectEDU’s bankruptcy filing differentiated how PII would be 
sold in chapter 7 and chapter 11.133 Unlike prior cases, where courts altered 
privacy policy terms to allow the sale of PII, here § 363(b)(1)(A) was strictly 
enforced, and ConnectEDU was not allowed to sell PII unless it complied with 
its privacy policy.134 The FTC recommended that the court appoint a consumer 
 
 127  Although it was not expressly defined in the letter from the FTC, the common usage of the word 
“purge,” in this context, implied that the data would be destroyed similarly as in prior cases. See Vladeck Letter 
to Larson, supra note 112; see also F.T.C. v. Toysmart.com, LLC, No. 00-CV-11341-RGS, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 21963 (D. Mass. Aug. 21, 2000) (ordering the destruction of information collected from children). 
 128  The FTC was referencing the unique circumstances of bankruptcy, where a company seeks either to 
reorganize or to liquidate assets to repay creditors. See Vladeck Letter to Baxter, supra note 8. 
 129  The FTC would allow the sale if: (1) Borders agreed not to sell the customer information as a standalone 
asset; (2) buyer was engaged in substantially the same lines of business; (3) buyer expressly agreed to be bound 
by and adhere to the terms of Borders’ privacy policy; and (4) buyer received affirmative consent from 
consumers for any changes to the privacy policy. Vladeck Letter to Baxter, supra note 8; see Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 232, 119 Stat. 231 (codifying the 
Toysmart standards). 
 130 Vladeck Letter to Baxter, supra note 8, at 4. 
 131  Mark S. Melodia & Paul J. Jaskot, Barnes & Noble’s Acquisition of Borders’ Database on the Shelf?, 
TECHNOLOGY L. DISPATCH (Sept. 23 2011), https://www.technologylawdispatch.com/2011/09/intellectual-
property/barnes-nobles-acquisition-of-borders-database-on-the-shelf/ (as evidenced by the $13.9 million dollar 
price tag B&N agreed to pay for the IP assets).  
 132  See Jeff Roberts, Did B&N Pull a Fast One with Borders’ Customer List?, GIGAOM (Oct. 5, 2011, 
11:48 AM), https://gigaom.com/2011/10/05/419-did-bn-pull-a-fast-one-with-borders-customer-list/ (“[i]n order 
to clinch its purchase of 40 million customer names from bankrupt Borders, Barnes & Noble made a series of 
promises to the court on steps it would take to protect the privacy of those customers.”). 
 133  In re ConnectEDU, Inc., No. 14-11238 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2014); Rich Letter, supra note 9.  
 134  Rich Letter, supra note 9. The Commissioner incorrectly cited 11 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)(A), which does 
not exist, instead of 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)(A). 
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privacy ombudsman to ensure the protection of consumer privacy interests.135 
The court ordered ConnectEDU to provide users with proper notice and the 
opportunity to remove PII; otherwise the users’ data would be destroyed. 
Ultimately, the court prevented the sale of PII because such sale would violate 
contract terms, and § 363(b)(1)(B)(ii) requires a “finding that no showing was 
made that such sale or such lease would violate applicable nonbankruptcy 
law.”136 
C. Technology, Data, and the Growing Threat 
The law and data security have been outpaced not only by technology but 
also by the growing threat to privacy. Targeted services and information 
collection are not new to the digital age, but modern technology has certainly 
helped expand them.137 Whereas efficient mailing systems facilitated direct 
marketing in the 1960’s, today’s age of big data allows for staggering breaches 
of email systems. One example of this would be in the Yahoo data breach of 
2016, where 500 million individuals’ records were exposed.138 As the collection 
and use of consumer information continued to grow exponentially, the threat to 
consumer privacy soared, even prior to today’s age of big data.139  
In 1984, a single Sears, Roebuck & Company store failed to secure its 
password, which enabled hackers to steal 90 million credit histories from their 
 
 135  However, current authority held by the ombudsman and common court treatment of these cases are 
insufficient to protect those privacy interests. Rich Letter, supra note 9; see 11 U.S.C. § 332 (2012) (if the sale 
goes against the privacy policy under a 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)(A) review, then 11 U.S.C. § 332 requires the 
appointment of a consumer privacy ombudsman when the sale operates under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)(B)). 
 136  11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
 137  See Nehf, supra note 2 (“Direct marketing to individuals was an inefficient and comparatively costly 
business practice for most of the twentieth century . . . . Cyberspace technologies and the widespread use of the 
Internet profoundly affected the data collection business by the late 1990s.”). 
 138  See id. (“Sorting data by zip codes proved to be a rough but inexpensive way to reach certain 
demographic subgroups.”); Gamio & Alcantara, supra note 4; see also Hayley Tsukayama, et al., Yahoo Data 
Breach Casts ‘Cloud’ over Verizon Deal, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/the-switch/wp/2016/09/22/report-yahoo-to-confirm-data-breach-affecting-hundreds-of-millions-of-
accounts/?utm_term=.28f2ef786a8f (comparing 32,000 records stolen in 2005 with the massive theft of 500 
million records in 2016); Ernie Hayden, Data Breach Protection Requires New Barriers, TECHTARGET (May 
2013), http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Data-breach-protection-requires-new-barriers.barriers. 
 139  Identity Theft: Is There Another You?: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms., Trade & 
Consumer Prot. and the Subcomm. on Fin. & Hazardous Materials of the Comm. on Commerce H.R., 106th 
Cong. (1999). Although the entire report speaks to identity theft, a statement of note is made in discussing 15 
U.S.C. § 1601: “[R]eports that consumer inquiries to the Trans Union credit bureau’s Fraud Victim Assistance 
Department increased from 35,235 in 1992 to 522,922 in 1997, and that the Social Security Administration’s 
Office of the Inspector General conducted 1,153 social security number misuse investigations in 1997, compared 
with 305 in 1996.”. 
TAN_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS 6/14/2018 3:47 PM 
702 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 34 
archives, computers, or filing systems.140 Although this was a massive data 
breach, it stemmed from the confluence of efforts by hackers and negligence by 
an employee.141 On November 2, 1988, the Morris Worm was released. It 
crippled approximately ten percent of the 88,000 computers that were on the 
internet at the time and caused about $15 million in damage.142 Note that the 
former was caused by user negligence and the latter was the result of a single 
person’s creation.  
In the 2000s, the GLBA143 allowed for the formation of Citigroup, whose 
2005 data breach was one in a series of examples that demonstrated the danger 
of increased data consolidation. Today’s threat to privacy is the result of multiple 
factors coming together: the constant introduction of new technology; increased 
consumer adoption of technology and information systems; consumer trust in 
companies; and the lack of security against data breaches. 
From 2005 to 2016, data breaches rose multiplicatively every few years, and 
the trend is unlikely to reverse without intervention. 
  
 
 140  See Stuart Diamond, Credit File Password is Stolen, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 1984), http://www. 
nytimes.com/1984/06/22/business/credit-file-password-is-stolen.html; Julianne Pepitone, 5 of the Biggest-Ever 
Credit Card Hacks, CNNTECH (Jan. 12. 2014, 7:11 PM), http://money.cnn.com/gallery/technology/security/ 
2013/12/19/biggest-credit-card-hacks/index.html. 
 141  See Diamond, supra note 140; Pepitone, supra note 140. 
 142  See Michelle Delio, The Greatest Hacks of All Time, WIRED (Feb. 6. 2001), https://www.wired.com/ 
2001/02/the-greatest-hacks-of-all-time/. 
 143  15 U.S.C. §§ 6801−6809 (2012). 
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Major Data Breaches (2005-2016) 
Year Entity People Affected 
2005 Citigroup144 3.9 Million 
2007 TJX Companies Inc.145 94 Million 
2009 Heartland Payment Systems146 130 Million 
2011 Sony PlayStation Network147 101 Million 
2013 Target148 70 Million 
2014 eBay149 145 Million 
2015 US Voter Data150 191 Million 
2016 Adult FriendFinder151 412 Million 
2016 Yahoo152 1 Billion 
As the chart above demonstrates, the increasing size and frequency of data 
breaches poses a problem for corporations. Although hardware is developing at 
a decreased pace, consumers are generating data at rapidly accelerating rates.153 
This is no anomaly. It simply shows that, as more consumers adopt new 
technologies or use information systems, the number of people generating data 
records increases in kind.154 This trend contributed to an average increase in data 
generation by a factor of ten every two years since 1986155 In 2013, 90 percent 
 
 144 See Zeller, supra note 96. 
 145  Pepitone, supra note 140. 
 146  Technically, the breach occurred over the course of multiple years, culminating in 2009. Andy 
Greenberg, The Year of the Mega Data Breach, FORBES (Nov. 24, 2009, 7:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
2009/11/24/security-hackers-data-technology-cio-network-breaches.html#2d79ae04d038. 
 147  See Nate Lord, The History of Data Breaches, DIGITAL GUARDIAN, https://digitalguardian.com/blog/ 
history-data-breaches (last visited Jan. 27, 2017) (combining Sony’s 2010 data breach of 77 million records with 
2011’s 24.6 million, for a total of 101 million). 
 148  Id. 
 149  Jim Finkle, Hackers Raid eBay in Historic Breach, Access 145 Million Records, REUTERS (May 21, 
2014, 11:01 PM), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ebay-password/hackers-raid-ebay-in-historic-breach-access-
145-million-records-idUKKBN0E10ZL20140522. 
 150  Jim Finkle & Dustin Volz, Database of 191 Million U.S. Voters Exposed on Internet, REUTERS (Dec. 
28, 2015, 7:22 PM), https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-usa-voters-breach/database-of-191-million-u-s-voters-
exposed-on-internet-researcher-idUKKBN0UB1E020151229. 
 151  Andrea Peterson, Adult FriendFinder Hit with One of the Biggest Data Breaches Ever, Report Says, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/11/14/adult-
friendfinder-hit-with-one-of-the-biggest-data-breaches-ever-report-says/?utm_term=.121d3da61b4a. 
 152  Vindu Goel & Nicole Perlroth, Yahoo Says 1 Billion User Accounts were Hacked, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/technology/yahoo-hack.html.  
 153  PETER HARSHA, IT Research and Development Funding, in CHASING MOORE’S LAW: INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 22 (William Aspray ed., 2004); Åse Dragland, Big Data – for 
Better or Worse, SINTEF (May 22, 2013), https://www.sintef.no/en/latest-news/big-data-for-better-or-worse/. 
 154  Id. 
 155 Lucas Mearian, Scientists calculate total data stores to date: 295+ exabytes, COMPUTERWORLD 
(Feb. 14, 2011), https://www.computerworld.com/article/2513110/data-center/scientists-calculate-total-data-
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of all data worldwide was shown to have been generated within the previous two 
years.156 By December 31, 2016, Facebook’s 1.86 billion monthly active users 
shared 216,302 videos per minute on Messenger.157 Currently, Google processes 
40,000 search queries every second, or 1.2 trillion searches per year.158 As new 
users adopt technology, data generation increases at a disproportionately high 
rate, which produces alarming amounts of collected data. 
Companies’ success in properly harnessing the data they collect correlates 
with improved corporate performance. Some reports, in fact, suggest that a 10 
percent increase in data accessibility can result in $65 million of additional net 
income for a typical Fortune 1000 company.159 FTC reports predict that by 2020, 
there will be 50 billion internet-connected devices and that 90 percent of cars 
will have an internet connection.160 The extensive and growing nature of data 
makes it essential for the law to keep pace. If the law fails to protect against 
technological threats today, as it did in Olmstead, the consequences will be 
drastic and may expose the intimate details of millions of individuals’ lives. 
D. Insufficient Means to an End 
BAPCPA161 and FTC regulatory goals may seek to protect consumer 
privacy, but the provisions, as drafted, provide insufficient protections for 
multiple reasons. First, bankruptcy courts may be applying state substantive law 
that should be trumped by federal law. Second, the scope of personally 
 
stored-to-date--295--exabytes.html (humankind has stored 295 exabytes of data since 1986); Dragland, supra 
note 153; The Digital Universe of Opportunities: Rich Data and the Increasing Value of the Internet of Things, 
EMC, https://www.emc.com/leadership/digital-universe/2014iview/executive-summary.htm (last visited Mar. 
18, 2018). 
 156  Dragland, supra note 153; accord Google Search Statistics, INTERNET LIVE STATS, 
http://www.internetlivestats.com/google-search-statistics/#ref-2 (last visited Feb. 19, 2017, 6:25 PM). 
 157  Data Never Sleeps 4.0, DOMO, https://www.domo.com/learn/data-never-sleeps-4-0 (last visited 
February 19, 2017). 
 158  Google Search Statistics, supra note 156. 
 159  Trips Reddy, Creating a Future-Ready Company in 2017, IBM WATSON (Dec. 21, 2016), 
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/watson/2016/12/creating-future-ready-company-2017-business-leaders-know/ 
(suggesting that a mere 10 percent increase in data accessibility will result in more than $65 million additional 
net income for a typical Fortune 1000 company). Cf. Ranjay Gulati, Inside Best Buy’s Customer-Centric 
Strategy, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 12, 2010), https://hbr.org/2010/04/inside-best-buys-customer-cent 
 160  Internet of Things, FED. TRADE COMMISSION STAFF REP. i, 1 (Jan. 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/ 
system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-november-2013-workshop-entitled-
internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf. 
 161  Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-8, 
§ 232, 119 Stat. 23; see Protecting Consumer Privacy, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/media-resources/protecting-consumer-privacy232 (the FTC has been the chief federal agency on privacy 
policy and enforcement since the 1970s). 
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identifiable information is too narrow. Last, qualified purchaser requirements 
contravene their intended purposes by limiting creditors’ economic redress and 
increasing the likelihood that information will be re-identified. 
1. Federal Discretion and Contracts 
The sale of consumer data is customarily governed by bankruptcy courts 
who weigh the aims of bankruptcy against privacy concerns.162 State law 
normally governs without federal override. BAPCPA, however, not only 
demonstrates the intent of Congress to allow bankruptcy courts to alter contract 
terms in privacy policies, but also grants them explicit authority to do so.163 
Some might argue that this authority contravenes contract law, but there are 
several reasons this is not the case. 
The law has traditionally frowned upon restraints on the power of alienation, 
such as in the conveyance of property.164 Companies offer goods to consumers 
in exchange for payment of the listed price and the collection of consumer data, 
and when customers buy from the company, they demonstrate acceptance of 
those terms.165 When those privacy policies promise never to sell or lease the 
data, it is a restraint on alienation and thus a suspect contract term.166 
However, consumer data is not identical to physical property. Turning 
instead to intellectual property law, importing concepts such as the first sale 
doctrine can provide analogies that further justify this override. In Cuozzo Speed 
Techs., LLC v. Lee, the Supreme Court analogized overturning a conviction 
based on the insufficiency of an indictment to disallowing inter partes review 
based on the “reasonable likelihood” of a party prevailing.167 First sale doctrine 
states that once a copy of a copyrighted work is purchased from the copyright 
 
 162  Cf. In re Tweeter Home Ent. Grp., No. 07-10787 (PJW), 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3418 (Bankr. D. Del. 
Oct. 2, 2007); see, e.g., Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. 
L. No. 109-8, § 232, 119 Stat. 23; In re Borders Grp., No. 11-10614 (MG), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 4606 (U.S. 
Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2011); In re RS Legacy Corp., No. 15-10197 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 5, 2015); 
 163  See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-
8, § 232, 119 Stat. 23. 
 164  Although it does not strictly refer to information, the concepts of selling, leasing, or conveying 
consumer data are easy to analogize with property. Cf. Andrews v. Hall, 58 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Neb. 1953) (“It 
is the general rule that a grant or devise of real estate to a designated person in fee simple, with provisions therein 
that are inconsistent or repugnant thereto such as a restriction against the power to sell, mortgage, or otherwise 
encumber, conveys an absolute fee and such restrictions are void.”).  
 165  Cf. U.C.C. §§ 2-204, 2-205, 2-206, 2-207 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (if a privacy 
policy is viewed as an additional term governing the collection of data, in addition to the offer and acceptance 
of the company’s good or service). 
 166  See, e.g., Andrews, 58 N.W.2d at 202–03. 
 167  Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC. v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2153 n.7 (2016). 
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holder, the copyright holder cannot prevent the copy from being resold.168 Here, 
just as the sale of a copyrighted work implicitly leads to the surrender of some 
rights, so may the sale of private consumer data allow privity to transfer from 
seller to purchaser in bankruptcies.169 
Since BAPCPA expressly discusses the de-identification, transfer, and sale 
of consumer information sold in bankruptcy, similar reasoning can justify 
overriding state contract law.170 Discretion has been given to bankruptcy courts 
to maximize a debtor’s estate to repay creditors while protecting the privacy of 
consumers. The question, then, is whether that discretion is being properly 
employed to meet those goals. 
2. De-identification and Lack of Security 
Mirroring the law’s failure to relinquish physical intrusion as a requirement 
for the invasion of privacy until Katz, the code’s definition of PII is trapped in 
times past.171 The Code’s definition of PII is limited to a physical address and 
corresponding telephone number or a physical person’s name, e-mail address, 
and social security number.172  
(A) if provided by an individual to the debtor in connection with 
obtaining a product or a service from the debtor primarily for personal, 
family, or household purposes— 
(i) the first name (or initial) and last name of such individual, 
whether given at birth or time of adoption, or resulting from a 
lawful change of name; 
(ii) the geographical address of a physical place of residence of 
such individual; 
(iii) an electronic address (including an e-mail address) of such 
individual; 
(iv) a telephone number dedicated to contacting such individual 
at such physical place of residence; 
 
 168  17 U.S.C. § 109 (2012). 
 169  See Kirtsaeng v. Wiley, 568 U.S. 519, 526, 529 (2013) (addressing the question of transfer of rights of 
alienability in the purchase, sale, and resale of copyrighted works, as well as whether contract terms or first sale 
doctrine would apply if in contradiction with one another). 
 170  Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-8, 
§§ 231–32, 119 Stat. 23. 
 171  See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465–66 (1928) (holding that wiretapping conversations 
within someone’s home was not an invasion of privacy, nor a violation of 4th or 5th Amendment protections); 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (recognizing nonphysical invasions of privacy). 
 172  11 U.S.C. § 101(41)(A) (2012). Note that this portion only applies if it is in connection with one of the 
above. As such, if someone has all of your data except for the things listed in § 101(41)(A), then it is not PII. 
That is why this Comment discusses how easy it is to identify someone without that data. 
TAN_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS 6/14/2018 3:47 PM 
2018] MAXIMIZING THE VALUE OF PRIVACY 707 
(v) a social security account number issued to such individual; 
or 
(vi) the account number of a credit card issued to such 
individual; or 
(B) if identified in connection with 1 or more of the items of 
information specified in subparagraph (A)— 
(i) a birth date, the number of a certificate of birth or adoption, 
or a place of birth; or 
(ii) any other information concerning an identified individual 
that, if disclosed, will result in contacting or identifying such 
individual physically or electronically.173 
This definition mainly addresses means of communicating with another person, 
but doesn’t even begin to address the intimate details that can be gained by more 
modern data collection.174 Consider that the code does not even peripherally 
address telephone metadata, such as text messages, numbers dialed, location 
tracking, or how long a conversation is held. Furthermore, the code covers only 
those telephone numbers that are “dedicated to contacting such individual at 
such physical place of residence.”175 This narrow scope arguably fails to include 
nearly half of United States households, as studies indicate that 49.3 percent of 
households use only wireless telephones.176  
Furthermore, any argument that names, social security numbers, and e-mail 
addresses are protected by the current language neglects to consider that it might 
be entirely unnecessary to directly collect that information in the digital age. 
Metadata177 labeled as “Customer Proprietary Network Information” is collected 
by telecommunications companies and “is densely interconnected, easily re-
identifiable, and trivially gives rise to location, relationship, and sensitive 
inferences.”178 While PII may allow third parties to contact, locate, or potentially 
 
 173  Id. 
 174  Id. 
 175  Id. 
 176  Stephen J. Blumberg & Julian V. Luke, Wireless Substitution: Early Release of Estimates from the 
National Health Interview Survey, January–June 2016, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH SCI. (Dec. 2016), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/wireless201612.pdf. To clarify the statistics, 49 percent of 
households are wireless-only, while 3.1 percent have no phone whatsoever, which would indicate that 52.4 
percent of households don’t have land lines. For the author’s purposes, however, the only interesting number is 
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 177 Metadata is generally defined as data that describes other data. This can take various forms including: 
image metadata regarding a picture’s size, color profile, resolution, creation date, alteration date, software used 
to create it; web page metadata describing the keywords for search engines and scripts running; or text document 
data that describes the author, creation date, document size, and software used to create it. 
 178  Jonathan Mayer et al., Evaluating the Privacy Properties of Telephone Metadata, 113 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.pnas.org/content/113/20/5536.full. 
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defraud consumers, metadata can predict personal details.179 One study was able 
to uncover private information, such as a subject’s health conditions or even to 
infer whether someone owned an ArmaLite (AR) rifle, using only telephone 
metadata and linking data points to publicly available information, such as listed 
telephone numbers.180 Current law provides customers with moderate 
protections from telemarketing, mass mailings, and e-mail spam, but does little 
to protect against identity theft or other invasions of privacy, such as revealing 
personal details through metadata.  
One issue unaddressed by BAPCPA’s requirement to de-identify PII is 
robocallers.181 Robocallers auto-dial phone numbers using Voice Over Internet 
Protocol (VOIP) services to deliver pre-recorded messages.182 Upon contacting 
a potential target, the system determines whether an individual is a desirable 
target before placing an operator on the phone.183 The FTC reports that the 
agency has undertaken more than 100 enforcement actions against 600 
companies and individuals responsible for billions of illegal calls.184 Since 
robocallers auto-dial phone numbers until they reach a potential target, de-
identifying PII is ineffective against this threat.185 Recognizing this, the FTC has 
instituted more creative measures, such as crowdsourcing186 security 
development to civic hackers.187  
The fundamental flaw of de-identifying PII is that it attempts to minimize 
harm while retaining monetary value. Paul Ohm eloquently summarized the 
problem by stating, “[d]ata can be either useful or perfectly anonymous but 
never both.”188 Ohm proposed that de-identification comes at a greater cost to 
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 181  How Does A Robocall Work?, FED. TRADE COMM’N https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/sites/default/ 
files/pictures/0381-robocalls-infographic.png (last visited Feb. 3, 2017); Robocalls, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
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 182  How Does A Robocall Work? supra note 181. 
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 184  Robocalls, supra note 181. 
 185  How Does A Robocall Work?, supra note 181. 
 186 Crowdsourcing. MERIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (2018), https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
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 187  DetectaRobo, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/contests/detectarobo (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2017) (“As part of the National Day of Civic Hacking on June 6, 2015, the FTC challenged the 
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calls were likely robocalls.”). 
 188  Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1704 (2010). 
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secure privacy, since re-identification continuously becomes easier and less 
expensive.189 
Bankruptcy may provide a thin veil of protection for consumer privacy 
through de-identification, but these measures are easily pierced by linkage 
attacks.190 Linkage attacks compare records in de-identified data sets with 
separate but related records to uniquely identify targets.191 With a greater 
number of data points, the success of these attacks can reach near-certainty.192 
An early study used U.S. Census data to uniquely identify 61 to 87 percent of 
the United States population with only three data points: five-digit ZIP Code, 
gender, and date of birth.193 The same study uniquely identified 18 percent of 
the U.S. population using only county, gender, and date of birth.194 When the 
study combined gender and date of birth with city, town, or municipality in the 
linkage attack, 53 percent of the U.S. population could be uniquely identified.195 
The difference between the last two is explained by the fact that more people 
share a county of residence in common than a specific city, town, or 
municipality.196 This demonstrates the inverse relationship between the number 
of people who share a data point and re-identification. In other words, as the 
number of people who share a data point increases, the utility of that data point 
for re-identification decreases.  
Even seemingly innocuous information can re-identify an individual, given 
the presence of sufficient data points. In 2006, Netflix released de-identified 
records of 500,000 subscribers for a contest to suggest improvements for the 
Netflix movie recommendation service.197 The data set was sparse and contained 
only movie ratings and dates, which Netflix believed made the information 
incapable of being re-identified.198 Researchers uniquely identified 99 percent 
 
 189  Id.  
 190  Garinkel, supra note 3; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 107(c), 332, 363(b) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7) (2012); 
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Data Privacy Working Paper, 2000), http://dataprivacylab.org/projects/identifiability/paper1.pdf. 
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 198  Arvin Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-Anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets, IEEE 
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of records that contained eight movie ratings and the dates they were 
reviewed.199  
Alarmingly, the results remained accurate even if two of the reviews were 
falsified and the dates provided fell within a 14-day margin of error.200 Using 
only two movie ratings and dates with a three-day margin of error allowed for 
68 percent unique identification.201 The research cross-referenced public IMDB 
ratings to bolster its records and further demonstrated that even something as 
trivial as movie preferences can reveal other, more personal details.202 The 
Sweeney studies showed that the strength of a data point can greatly increase the 
success of a linkage attack. Yet, the Netflix study shows that, given a sufficient 
number of data points, linkage attacks can reach nearly 100 percent success rates 
regardless of the strength of each data point. 
The amount of data collected and speed by which it can be processed renders 
de-identification as nothing more than a nuisance in the modern age. 
3. Qualified Purchasers Are Better Linkers 
Ever-growing data sets, the consolidation of data through bankruptcy, and 
linkage attacks present a combined threat to privacy unforeseen by existing legal 
treatments. This is made worse by the current “protection” measures requiring a 
qualified purchaser. The inefficacy of de-identifying PII would have been made 
evident when B&N purchased customer PII from Borders, but the court did not 
utilize de-identification and required an opportunity for customers to opt out 
instead.203 Even if Borders customer PII had been de-identified, the Netflix 
experiment creates a reasonable expectation that each Borders customer could 
be re-identified by B&N.204 Borders customer data that was de-identified could 
contain information such as age, ZIP Code of place of purchase, residence, book 
preferences, and date of purchase. B&N could cross-reference de-identified 
records with its own customer records and link the de-identified PII records to 
its existing customers. If any link failed, B&N could wait for further data points 
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as customers continued to buy books, or could wait for a Borders customer to 
buy his or her first book from B&N. 
Since Borders cannot serve as a clear example, RadioShack’s disparate 
treatment of contract terms will help frame the issue further.205 General Wireless 
purchased RadioShack and Apple customer information, but it was not allowed 
to purchase AT&T and Verizon customer data.206 Since General Wireless and 
Sprint would be re-opening RadioShack stores together and would both compete 
with AT&T and Verizon in the mobile service market, the court was arguably 
preventing the acquisition of an unfair competitive advantage.207 Apple, on the 
other hand, provides hardware and not mobile services, so Apple was unlikely 
to suffer unfair competition from the sale.208 This decision reinforces bankruptcy 
courts’ discretionary power and provides an example of de-identified data sets 
that were sold to someone with related data. 
RadioShack customer data such as phone numbers, credit card information, 
social security numbers, dates of birth and other PII were de-identified to protect 
privacy, but this also adversely affected the value of the data set.209 The problem 
is that the information still included the “where, when, and what,” and likely 
also the “how,” of an item’s purchase. Thus, for each item purchased, there are 
at least three other data points. For example, if someone buys an iPhone from 
the new Sprint/General Wireless operation, then that person is almost certainly 
going to be re-identified. The inherent problem of the qualified purchaser 
requirement is that it greatly increases the likelihood of relatable data points, 
which defeats the purpose of data being de-identified in the first place.210  
Requiring information be de-identified and sold only to qualified purchasers 
further devalues the already diminished bankruptcy sale price of consumer data. 
If contract terms are being ignored to provide redress to creditors, then 
bankruptcy courts should not work against the stated goal. In bankruptcy, 
Borders sold its intellectual property for $13.9 million, which equates to about 
 
 205  Rich Letter, supra note 9. 
 206  See Rich Letter, supra note 9; Salvatore, supra note 13. 
 207  See Rich Letter, supra note 9; Salvatore, supra note 13. 
 208 See, e.g., APPLE, https://www.apple.com/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2018) (showing the site does not offer 
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 209  See Suni Munshani, RadioShack Customers Won this Round, We Still Need Better Data Privacy 
Guidelines, VENTUREBEAT (May 25, 2015, 4:00 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2015/05/25/radioshack-
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 210  Consider also that, in October 2016, the U.S. cellphone market share was 35 percent Samsung, 32 
percent Apple, 14 percent LG, and 5 percent Motorola. See Lauren Guenveur, LG Flourishes While Moto 
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$0.29 per customer; RadioShack sold its intellectual property package for $26.2 
million, or about $0.39 per customer.211 Borders’ top twenty unsecured creditors 
were collectively owed $241 million, which is over ten times what Borders 
collected by selling customer data.212 RadioShack owed its top fifty creditors 
$373.9 million, which is seven times more than what it collected from selling its 
customer information.213 Considering that neither RadioShack’s nor Borders’ 
customer data was sold as a stand-alone asset, these are likely inflated sale 
values. 
These post-bankruptcy values are paltry when compared to the estimated 
$100 million Kroger earns annually by sharing data from its customers.214 
Although a solvent company’s data is worth more than one in bankruptcy, that 
doesn’t explain why Kroger earns thirty times more per year on a similar asset 
and does even less to explain how little data sells for in other circumstances. 
Consumer data is rapidly generated, yet it is poorly secured. Both the rapid 
generation of consumer data and its poor security further limits consumer data 
values when they are treated as a commodity. Looking at general data values, as 
sold by brokers, sheds light on how little value can be placed on personal 
information. General information can be valued at as little as $0.0005 per 
person215 while slightly more specialized information, such as PII of people 
receiving some healthcare treatment, can sell for up to $0.26 per person.216 
Knowing these values, we can infer that data values vary wildly depending on 
the buyer, seller, market, and content. 
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4. Assets and Economics 
Few concepts are as fundamental as supply and demand. Generally, as the 
number of buyers decreases, so does the demand for a product. The product’s 
price will fall if a decrease in demand is not matched by a decrease in supply.217 
Consumer data follows the same principles, but the nature of its sale in 
bankruptcy may be better viewed as an auction rather than an open market. 
Here, the willingness to pay is correlated to a few distinct qualities of the 
consumer data being sold. Some of these distinct qualities include number of 
data points, relevance to the purchaser’s business, competition for the purchase, 
and the availability of substitutes. De-identification reduces the number of data 
points sold, which in turn decreases the value of a data set. Although the 
qualified purchaser requirement may increase the likelihood that a data set will 
be relevant to a potential buyer, it is self-evident that a buyer would be unlikely 
to purchase irrelevant data.  
Instead, the qualified purchaser requirement reduces the number of 
competitors seeking the data set, which lowers demand and price. As established 
earlier, the availability of substitutes can be seen both as ever-increasing and 
finite, depending on the view. Since data is produced at such accelerated rates, 
there is always more data in the market, but the opposite argument would focus 
on the uniqueness of a data point. If each data point is unique, then a data set can 
potentially maintain value even if new data sets are created, or against the 
passage of time. 
Consider Borders’ customer information. The data set comprises the 
customer information of a consolidated book retail chain that was one of two 
major retailers in the business of brick-and-mortar bookselling. This data set 
shows the results of decisions made by Borders that are not shared by B&N, 
which can illustrate a variety of lessons on how to predict market outcomes 
based on certain inputs. If you combine it with the data already owned by B&N, 
you can then ascertain the total market effects of the two companies’ divergent 
strategies.  
Combining this data set with those of Best Buy and Circuit City would 
further allow a company to analyze the success and failure of companies in two 
markets with two principal retail chains. The problem with the qualified 
purchaser requirement is that, if a company is neither a bookseller nor an 
electronics retailer, it would not be allowed to purchase either data set. 
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The qualified purchaser requirement seeks to make data safe and valuable, 
but instead reduces anonymity and stifles utility.218 Imposing a limitation on who 
can purchase data does not increase value but, in fact, reduces value by limiting 
market demand, while doing nothing to increase safety. This decrease in 
consumer data value works against the principal aim of bankruptcy and 
decreases the incentive to protect privacy, since tort remedies are based on the 
harm suffered. 
5. Reducing the Negative Right to Privacy 
Torts are the common method for enforcing privacy. This places a great 
burden on consumers, because they must prove harm if they are to receive 
damages.219 In theory, companies are supposed to protect consumer privacy both 
out of duty to customers and to avoid tort liability. If the law lowers consumer 
data values, it lowers the incentive for companies to provide security, the brunt 
of which is borne by the consumer. Since data values are so low, a company that 
fails to secure consumer data is unlikely to face any meaningful repercussions 
and thus has little incentive to operate otherwise. 
In November 2014, Sony Pictures was hacked, which led to the breach of 
the social security numbers of over 47,000 celebrities and employees.220 Sony 
spent $35 million to repair its financial and IT systems—an inconsequential sum 
compared to Sony’s reported $331 million income, before taxes, in fiscal 
2015.221 The company’s former director of information security openly admitted 
that investing $10 million to secure against $1 million in losses was not in the 
company’s interests.222 This mentality was especially evident in the manner in 
which the security systems were maintained. Sony’s information sector 
 
 218  Ohm, supra note 188. 
 219  See Mark A. Geisfeld, The Coherence of Compensation-Deterrence Theory in Tort Law, 61 DEPAUL 
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computers sat, logged in, in an unlocked room that was occasionally left 
unguarded.223 When Guardians of Peace hacked Sony, the company was not just 
unprepared, it also failed to respond to the privacy threats with any sense of 
urgency.224 Sony eventually strengthened its security, but only after the hacks 
resulted in the resignation of an executive and directly threatened Sony’s ability 
to generate revenue. Movie stars, politicians, and many others were affected by 
leaked e-mails revealing controversial statements, which painted Sony in a 
negative light.225 Sony is not the only company whose data has been 
compromised, nor is its breach cost to revenue ratio unique.  
In 2013, hackers stole forty million Target customer credit card numbers and 
70 million other customer records, such as e-mail addresses and phone 
numbers.226 Target faced liability for a net total of $105 million after insurance 
reimbursements and tax deductions, accounting for 0.1 percent of Target’s 2014 
sales.227 When an estimated fifty million Home Depot customer credit card and 
e-mail addresses were hacked, it cost Home Depot $28 million. This is less than 
0.01 percent of its 2014 sales.228 Since tort liability is the primary method to 
address privacy breaches, there is a need for change. 
Sony’s data breach cost more per record stolen than the Target or Home 
Depot breaches combined. The cause of this discrepancy can help determine the 
problem. Sony expected to pay $1063.83 per person, but the information was 
owned by wealthy individuals, those in possession of sensitive Sony 
information, or both.229 Target paid $1.50 per person and Home Depot paid 
$0.56 per person, which is dwarfed by Sony’s per-person costs. This difference 
is likely a combination of whose information was stolen as well as the fact that 
the Sony hack was politically motivated230 rather than a simple data theft. In 
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2016, Yahoo’s data breach became the largest in U.S. history, with 1.5 billion 
accounts exposed.231 Although Yahoo lost $350 million from its sales price to 
Verizon, that loss translates to only $0.23 per customer record stolen.232  
What makes the token cost to Home Depot and Target particularly egregious 
is that the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA) places a disproportionate 
burden on consumers to protect themselves when a company fails to secure 
data.233 Under EFTA, a consumer who reports a card stolen within two days of 
activity is free from liability, but if the theft is reported after two days and before 
six months, the person can be liable for $50 to $500.234 Customers can easily be 
liable for costs that are hundreds of times greater than when a company fails to 
protect data it has collected. Securing data costs time, money, and resources that 
companies are likely to spend elsewhere because they are liable for the smaller 
share of the cost when data is breached. 
Current market interventions by the state seek to optimize economic 
efficiency, but arguably accomplish the opposite. Data sold in bankruptcy not 
only exacerbates privacy threats, but the sale contravenes bankruptcy’s goal of 
providing redress to creditors.235 Diminishing consumer data values in 
bankruptcy further reduce company liabilities for failing to secure data. Since 
consumers pay most of the cost of data breaches, it is important that the law 
promote privacy protections with greater efficacy to better serve the people.  
De-identifying PII is a protection long outpaced by technology and only 
serves to lower consumer data values in bankruptcy. This treatment is neither 
useful to bankruptcy’s goal of redress, nor is it an effective means of protecting 
privacy.  
Qualified purchaser requirements place artificial limits on the number of 
buyers, which decreases competition and demand.236 Since bankruptcy has 
limited influence on supply, decreases in demand will invariably decrease 
price.237 Acting with the supply-demand curve in mind, bankruptcy courts can 
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better provide redress to creditors and also establish stronger incentives for 
companies to protect consumer privacy. 
6. FTC as the Gap Filler 
Acting FTC Chairman Ohlhausen recently wrote, “We have long defined 
sensitive information to include financial information, health information, 
Social Security Numbers, information about children, and precise geolocation 
information.”238 She further explains that the FTC now includes television 
viewing activity within the definition of sensitive information.239 The FTC’s 
justification is that the possession of television viewing activity can or is likely 
to cause a “substantial injury” under 14 U.S.C. § 45(n), but “substantial injury” 
in the context of consumer information requires clarification and 
reconsideration.240 
Consumers face a greater threat of substantial injury as big data collects 
increasingly personal information, which reinforces the need for stronger data 
security.241 Reports of dark web activity show what data is currently selling for 
and indicate that social media accounts and other communication account 
information sell for more than credit card information. The following chart lays 
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 238  Statement of Acting Chairman Maureen K. Ohlhausen, In re Vizio, Inc., No. 1623024 (Feb. 6, 2017), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1070773/vizio_concurring_statement_of_chair
man_ohlhausen_2-6-17.pdf. 
 239  Id. 
 240  Id.; see also 14 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012) (“In determining whether an act or practice is unfair, the 
Commission may consider established public policies as evidence to be considered with all other evidence. Such 
public policy considerations may not serve as a primary basis for such determination”). 
 241  Caroline Humer & Jim Finke, Your Medical Record is Worth More to Hackers than Your Credit Card, 
REUTERS (Sep. 24, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cybersecurity-hospitals-idUSKCN0HJ21I2014 
0924. 
 242  Underground Hacker Markets Annual Report, SECUREWORKS (April 2016), https://www.secureworks. 
com/resources/rp-2016-underground-hacker-marketplace-report. 
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Hackers seek personal information such as social media and e-mail accounts 
because identity is the foundation of financial transactions. The FCRA enabled 
the economy to use customer data and foresaw the need for protection even 
though the law has been inadequate in providing it. FTC regulations have 
worked to protect consumer privacy and have assisted bankruptcy courts in 
doing the same. This Comment proposes that bankruptcy better serve its own 
interests while assisting the FTC in its mission to protect consumers. 
Bankruptcy courts are in the unique position to split the burden of protecting 
consumer privacy among the government, public, and companies. As Congress, 
the FTC, and the courts establish solutions, companies can be incentivized to 
respect consumer privacy as a right to be protected instead of a minimal cost to 
be ignored. 
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
If the law seeks to provide redress to creditors, then requiring a qualified 
purchaser and de-identifying consumer information works against that purpose. 
De-identification does not provide sufficient security, and qualified purchasers 
are more likely to circumvent the already weak protections. A limited pool of 
buyers decreases competition, which, in turn, decreases price. As the price of 
consumer data decreases, so does a company’s liability if the data is breached. 
If consumer data sells for a greater value in bankruptcy, then the consumer can 
argue for a greater value when that data is breached, which strengthens 
companies’ incentive to bolster security. 
A. Bankruptcy Courts Should Use Their Discretion to Set Increased Minimum 
Liability for a Company’s Failure to Secure Purchased Data 
Asset distributions operate under constant state economic intervention from 
the moment the goods are made available to the state-regulated market.248 These 
interventions are made necessary by the very nature of bankruptcy itself, since 
the discharge of debts often results in legally circumventing prior contractual 
obligations.249 State interventions impose artificial limitations on market inputs, 
which directly affect market outcomes. 
 
 248  See 11 U.S.C. § 726. (2012). 
 249  Phillipe Aghion, Oliver Hart, & John Moore, The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, in THE 
TRANSITION IN E. EUR., VOL. 2 (Jan. 1994), http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6727.  
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Bankruptcy courts should use their discretion to create more equitable 
alterations of contract terms. Currently, consumers are forced into privity of 
contract with new parties, often without consumer consent. Instead, to ensure 
that consumers are benefitting from the bargain or at least do not suffer from it, 
courts should require the purchaser of consumer data to accept increased liability 
for failing to secure consumer data. Establishing this liability can be done in two 
ways.  
First, the court can calculate current market values for consumer data, not as 
it stands in bankruptcy, but as an asset in a living market. To establish the current 
market value of consumer data, courts should aggregate consumer data as 
expected values both in and out of bankruptcy. This will yield a value that is 
more commensurate with the actual market and allow for more accurate 
reflections of what values companies should place on security.  
Expected values are predicted values of a variable, calculated as the sum of 
all possible values each multiplied by the probability of its occurrence.250 Here, 
the court would aggregate an expected value by using four variables: (1) the 
value of the consumer data before bankruptcy, (2) the probability of surviving 
bankruptcy, (3) the value of the consumer data in bankruptcy, and (4) the 
probability of bankruptcy liquidation. Taking the product of the value of 
multiplying the value of the data before bankruptcy by the probability of the 
company surviving bankruptcy produces the probable value of the data outside 
of bankruptcy. Multiplying the value of data in bankruptcy and the probability 
of bankruptcy resulting in liquidation then produces the value of data in 
bankruptcy. 
The value of consumer data before bankruptcy can be found by pricing 
similar consumer data available on the market. The court would use prior cases 
or prices offered to price the value of consumer data in bankruptcy in the current 
case. Probability of survival or liquidation could use prior bankruptcy cases with 
similar circumstances or other uses of discretion. Second, courts should 
calculate the average cost of consumer data breaches borne by the consumer and 
the government. In other words, aggregate the direct and incidental financial 
losses incurred from a data breach, such as the cost of paying for fraudulent 
charges, increased interest rates, decreased credit scores, and cost to investigate 
and combat fraud to find the value of the data. Once the aggregate harm is 
 
 250  One example of this concept is the Learned Hand Formula used as a calculus of negligence. Judge 
Learned Hand proposed that negligence can be proven where the burden of preventing a harm is outweighed by 
the probability of the harm multiplied by the magnitude of the harm. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 
159 F.2d 169 (2d. Cir. 1947). 
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established, the burden should be distributed among the negligent parties based 
on comparative fault.251 
Combining these two calculations, a qualified purchaser can choose to 
accept a base amount of financial liability based on these values. If accepted, the 
company would then have to consider the cost of a guaranteed data breach 
against a calculated cost of security. For example, if a company totally fails to 
secure its data, then one can assume that a breach is guaranteed. Say that breach 
would cause the company to face $1 million liability. This incentivizes the 
company to spend no more than $1 million on protecting its data.  
Now, take those same facts but add data security to the equation. The 
company knows that spending money on security will decrease the likelihood of 
a breach. Therefore, the company would be incentivized to conduct a cost-
benefit analysis to determine how much money to spend on security. Assume 
that the company decides to spend $500,000 on security and estimates that this 
will reduce the chance of breach to 25 percent. In the current example, the 
company still incurs a risk of breach occurring but has now balanced that risk 
against the potential reward. By spending $500,000 on security, the company 
would have a 75 percent chance of incurring a $500,000 discount from the initial 
$1 million liability, but also has a 25 percent chance of incurring a liability of 
$1.5 million. These numbers would actually be smaller because it is intuitive 
 
 251  To illustrate this, imagine a company has a 30 percent probability of successfully executing a chapter 
11 plan and it possesses data on one million customers that is worth an aggregate market value of fifteen million. 
The value of the data would then be an estimated 4.5 million dollars, or $4.50 per customer. If that same company 
then has a 70 percent probability of being forced to liquidate through chapter 7 bankruptcy and the data will 
likely sell for half a million dollars, then the value of the data in bankruptcy would be $350,000 dollars or $0.35 
per customer. If this were further aggregated by weighing each value, then the expected value of the data would 
be the product of the value in bankruptcy multiplied by the likelihood of liquidation added to the likelihood of 
surviving bankruptcy multiplied by the value of the data before bankruptcy. Here, that would result in a non-
bankruptcy value of 1.35 million dollars and a bankruptcy value of $245,000 dollars resulting in an expected 
value of $1.595 million dollars. To calculate this number, the court simply looks to prior incidents. If a similar 
company suffered a breach and one hundred thousand consumers suffered an average loss of four hundred 
dollars, the consumer burden would be forty million dollars. If the government spent two million dollars 
combatting that breach and investigating the matter, then the government burden is two million dollars. That 
would be an aggregate of forty-two million dollars of harm. If eighty percent of consumers were found liable for 
half the loss due to improper security on their part, then that harm could be lowered to sixteen million for 
consumer harms and two million for government harms totaling eighteen million in aggregate harm. To prevent 
burdening companies with onerous penalties, that value would then be calculated using the Learned Hand 
Formula to establish duty. Calculate the likelihood of a data breach, multiply it by the aggregate harm, and then 
compare to the costs of securing the data. Instead of holding the company liable for all, the court can choose to 
discount the cost of securing data. Thus, in the above example, if the harm is $240 per consumer and the company 
spent $225 per consumer to prevent a breach, then the result would be $15 per consumer. The court could then 
require the company purchasing the data to accept a minimum liability of $15 per consumer record. 
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that if a company spends money on security, then a breach would result in less 
than 100 percent of the data being stolen, which means the liability would be 
lower.  
In conclusion, the company’s risk profile would determine how it conducts 
its cost-benefit analysis, which would influence how much money it chose to 
spend on security. As a general rule, if the damages a company would incur 
increases, so does the amount that is cost-effective to secure against those 
damages. 
B. Bankruptcy Courts Should Redefine What Constitutes Qualified 
Purchasers and What They May Purchase 
If the bankruptcy court redefines the qualified purchaser requirement, the 
pool of potential buyers will increase. This, in turn, should increase what 
companies pay for consumer data because there will be increased competition 
among prospective buyers. The threat of a purchaser abusing the data it acquires 
can be mitigated by setting liability minimums that elevate the company’s risk 
calculations. The qualified purchaser requirement is supposed to limit the sale 
of consumer data to only those who seek the data for good faith reasons. If a 
company is not a qualified purchaser under the current framework, then it can 
demonstrate good faith by accepting increased liability. 
Again, the bankruptcy court can use its discretion to set a limited increase in 
liability value for a “qualified purchaser,” and a greater increased liability value 
for anyone who does not qualify for a discounted rate.252 
C. Bankruptcy Courts Should Order Unsold Data Destroyed 
If data is not sold in bankruptcy distributions under this system, then it 
demonstrates the data’s lack of value or that no buyer is willing to accept the 
burden of securing the data. In either circumstance, the destruction of data serves 
the dual purposes of decreasing supply to increase the value of other data and of 
preventing the harm that would occur if an irresponsible buyer were to acquire 
the data. 
If bankruptcy courts were to set increased minimum liability values for 
failure to prevent a breach of consumer data sold in bankruptcy, companies 
would have greater incentive to secure data and increase data values. These 
increased values would strengthen incentives to protect consumer privacy by 
 
 252  Using the prior example, the value could be set between $15 and $240 per consumer record. 
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increasing the amount that companies pay for consumer data—both before and 
after bankruptcy filings. This circular relationship would see data security and 
values rise and would serve to increase redress to creditors while simultaneously 
increasing consumer privacy protections. In turn, it would raise awareness of 
consumer privacy, since there would now be a financial interest in protecting 
these rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Current legislative treatment aims to increase security and maximize redress. 
This treatment limits who may purchase data and attempts to increase security 
through anonymization. These efforts are meant to allow for private data assets 
to increase redress to creditors, but by compromising both, consumers are left 
without adequate privacy protections and the data sold is often undervalued. To 
combat this inefficiency, bankruptcy judges should use their discretion to 
increase the amount of redress to creditors while ensuring greater protections for 
consumer privacy.  
By implementing a minimum liability value for failing to protect these 
assets, companies have an increased incentive to secure that data. The 
subsequent increase in security investment will affect the data’s market value 
before bankruptcy, which in turn will increase its value in bankruptcy. As the 
liability for data breaches increases, so will investment and the end result will 
increase the security of consumer privacy and the redress provided to creditors 
when data is sold in bankruptcy. 
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